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Introduction Sustaining Global Hope: Sovereignty, Power and the Transformation of Diplomacy
Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian
Can diplomacy be saved? Can diplomacy save us? Take a singular event highlighting hope and the possibility of redemption like the awarding of the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize to US President Barack Obama. It does not constitute an epoch but it did signify a profound rupture from past practices. Lost in the controversy over the worthiness of the recipient and the debate about rewarding aspirations rather than actual accomplishments was the message itself: diplomacy would once again be in the service of peace and cooperation rather than of war and violence. Diplomacy was in the lede of the announcement:
The Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2009 is to be awarded to President Barack Obama for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples.
It was in the body:
Multilateral diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United Nations and other international institutions can play.
And it was in the finale:
His diplomacy is founded in the concept that those who are to lead the world must do so on the basis of values and attitudes that are shared by the majority of the world's population. 1 Obama's concept of diplomacy is not a new one. Nor is the rehabilitation of diplomacy an exclusive effort of the current US administration. willingness to accommodate and learn from other ways of living but also to revise one's own way of living and doing things. The shift from nationalinterest diplomacy to regional-or global-interest diplomacy is substantial yet can also be rhetorical; thus the need to remain vigilant and critically reflexive about the discourse of sustainability, subalternity, humanitarianism, and other normatively loaded concepts. It certainly does not mean that the pursuit of a global interest is necessarily less violent than the pursuit of a national interest; but it does mean that the preser vation of other ways of living is more likely to be acknowledged and supported within a more holistic, regional, or global-interest framework.
Perhaps the first step towards a sustainable diplomacy is to restore diplomacy as a virtue. If we are to follow Aristotelian terms (1934) , to be a diplomat ab initio entails the notion of being a 'good diplomat' (the two are inseparable). The ethical imperative is not to take diplomats as they happen to be but as they ought to be if they are to realize their telos or functional excellence. The virtuous diplomat should not be an obedient servant but potentially a challenger and modifier of policies, including of the policy one is called to serve. This is where Aristotelian virtue is complemented by Machiavellian virtuosity. Note Machiavelli's advice in his letter to Raffaello Girolami that in order to discharge his embassy to Spain not just faithfully but adequately, he needs to get to know not only the character of the sovereign to whom he is sent but also of the sovereign who sent him and skilfully adapt his practice in order to mediate between them (Machiavelli, 1522 (Machiavelli, /2004 . The point is further exemplified in Bruno Latour's reflection on none other than the famous Talleyrand, specifically that the diplomat's role is that 'he imposes on the very ones who sent him [a] fundamental doubt about their own requirements' (Latour, 2004, p. 216 ). Diplomats may not always have the opportunity to do that; specific conditions of practising may not allow critique but only advocacy. Yet the point to make here is that besides implementing foreign policy objectives diplomats ought, on the basis of the diplomatic encounter, to raise questions and doubts, not only about the position of others, but about the position of their own government. In other words, the virtuous diplomat should be able to advise and experiment on what modifications are necessary to negotiate terms of amity, agreement or co-existence. and to that extent President Obama had an easy act to follow. In times of desperation -with or without glimpses of hope -temptation grows to compare the present condition to an imaginary past. High on the list of golden ages would be the so-called classical era of diplomacy when a corps of Great Ambassadors representing a condominium of Great Pow ers exercised Great Responsibility to bring a hundred years of peace; that is, of course, in certain territories of Europe and until the same corps also helped usher in the Great War. Closer scrutiny reveals more cracks in the mirror that we hold up to the present. 'Civilizing processes' cloaked hegemonic agendas and coercive treaty-making; universal reason, upon contact with alien beliefs, proved to be little more than a cultural norm of convenience framing negotiation; the lowest Machiavellian practices were justified in the name of the highest Kantian ends; and class conflict was displaced and magnified by imperialism into a global civil war, the consequences of which are still being felt in the international system. In the history of diplomacy there is as much if not more to disappoint as to celebrate.
Rather than gaze backward in fear or nostalgia, one can use historical insight to plot progress towards a new appreciation of diplomacy. Indeed, diplomacy needs and is bound to be re-appreciated in the post-Bush era. After a POTUS (President of the United States) who aspired to be LOTFW (Leader of the Free World) sent his highest diplomat, Secretary of State Colin Powell to obfuscate and misinform, if not lie to, the UN about WMD in Iraq, whose Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, advocated the decapitation ('take the top ten floors off') of the UN Secretariat Building in New York, diplomacy can only improve. In sharp contrast, Presidential-candidate Obama repeatedly voiced his willingness to talk to world leaders declared persona non grata by his opponent; in his first week as President, Obama made a commitment for 'engaged diplomacy'; and in the first six months of his office, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled over 100,000 miles to 30 countries and held countless town hall meetings, to conduct 'not just diplomacy between government officials [but] diplomacy between people'. 2 After eight years in which diplomacy was not just disengaged but disposable, as strange as it might sound, Obama appeared to offer a more realistic option. To follow on the main principles of one of the founding figures of classical realism, Hans Morgenthau (1985, pp. 584-6) , diplomacy under Bush was infested with a crusading spirit that aimed at global salvation rather than the establishment or preservation of peace. What is more, and here we argue contra Morgenthau, it perpetuated the division of the world through the essentialist and simplistic categories of 'us' vs. 'them', an increasingly uneasy and often senseless binary for dealing with complex global problems such as security, the environment and financial crises.
Let us leave partisan politics aside and intuitively consider the future of diplomacy. Is diplomacy still a viable institution? Can it still inspire hope to resolve major problems and enhance global peace, security and solidarity? Writing about these issues in North America, the negatives scream at us from the headlines: failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a war against terror that we are told one day can be won, the next that it cannot; between a war in Iraq that was declared over, yet grinds on; and, more generally, between the way things are and the way we would wish them to be. Yet, when considering these issues from our first vantage point in Cyprus -a nation with its own 'protracted problem' and the gravestone of many an aspiring diplomat -one cannot but recall the faultline of diplomacy's modern origins. From the orientalized Byzantine practice that Harold Nicolson saw as responsible for transmitting the 'defects of duplicity and suspicion' (Nicolson, 1954, p. 27; cf. Constantinou, 2000) to fifteenth-century Italian diplomats instructed to take their cook with them (to avoid poisoning) but leave the wife behind (to avoid loose lips), we should not be too quick to ascribe immaculate origins and practices to the art of diplomacy. No immaculate origins means no perfect futures either.
A negative spirit seems to rule the world of diplomacy and muzzle hope -which is why Obama's message appeared so appealing to both US voters and Nobel Peace Prize jurists. Worse, this negative spirit seems to accelerate as the news cycle shrinks, as classical diplomacy gives way to its public form. Inordinate means are too often and too quickly applied to ill-conceived ends; hegemonic agendas pass off as humanitarian practices in the global media; strategies of sovereign power cause or exacerbate problems, overrule and spin off their lack of resolution. Great moments of hope, like 11/9, when hammer blows to the Berlin Wall marked a symbolic end to a half-century of Cold War diplomacy, are too easily reversed by global events of terror, like 9/11, when kamikaze aircraft piloted by jihadists crashed into the Twin Towers.
Yet disappointment with diplomacy is not a new phenomenon. Those versed in the literature of diplomatic studies recall the classic debate between 'old' and 'new' diplomacy, a contest with moral undertones recurring at different stages in history, and referring to calls for diplomatic change as well as reactions to such change. To be sure, the terms old and new diplomacy have their analytical limits and are perhaps overused in the literature; but the compelling need to account for -if not to demand -changes in diplomatic conduct is quite revealing of how historically there existed periods of ethical and political uneasiness concerning diplomacy and its overall impact on those it was meant to serve.
A brief genealogy of modern, Western diplomacy may be useful to illustrate the point. In the literature, we are told that a characteristically new diplomacy came about following the disastrous religious wars in Europe and the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), that is in the form of the secularization of diplomatic discourse, the progressive monopolization of diplomacy by the nation state and the advent of raison d'état that replaced medieval universalism as the core moral principle of intrastate and interstate conduct. Another new arrived with French Revolutionary diplomacy, the dissatisfaction with and challenge against non-representative diplomacy (dynastic or aristocratic), and thus the call for diplomacy to be popularized and conducted in the name and interests of the 'people' rather than the person of the king as in the ancien regime. Another new diplomacy followed World War I and the Wilsonian challenge to secret and imperial diplomacy, criticized by the representatives of the old order as 'megaphone diplomacy' but aspects of which progressively led to decolonization and new state actors as well as the rise of global governmental organizations, like the League of Nations and the UN. And yet another new diplomacy came about more recently with the proliferation of multilateral or issue diplomacy; this has been lately combined with the rise of public diplomacy and the slow but increasing recognition of non-governmental organizations, civil society and people in general as diplomatic stakeholders. (For a range of debates on 'old' and 'new' diplomacy corresponding to different practices and historical periods, see Anderson, 1993; Der Derian, 1987; Eban, 1983; Garrison and Phipps, 1989; Gilbert, 1951; Nicolson, 1963; Reus-Smit, 1999; Riordan, 2003; Sofer, 1988) .
The periodic advent of new diplomacies was accompanied each time with large doses of hope; invariably hope for peace, emancipation, security, prosperity, equality and other normative aspirations. Yet to assess why and how these hopes have been frustrated cannot be properly done without the recognition that the promise of diplomacy, just like any idea or practice, is contestable. What it means to practise diplomacy or be diplomatic remains an open question. Whose interests does diplomacy serve or should serve? Who has or ought to have the right to diplomacy? How does one represent and negotiate in the name of that right? How far are diplomatic methods and innovations the result of new social and economic orders rather than liberal or humanist ideals? All these are difficult questions, and though diplomatic theory has PROOF sought to provide answers (e.g. Constantinou, 1996; Der Derian, 1987; Jönsson and Hall, 2005; Neumann, 2005; Sharp, 1997; Watson, 1982) , what is perhaps most interesting and beneficial is not the response of this or that theoretical approach but the continuous posing of such questions in different, real-life diplomatic contexts where the implications of practice can more easily be assessed.
This is exactly what this book seeks to do. It proposes that if a worthy goal of diplomacy is the hope of mediating difference in ways that remain sensitive to the Self as well as to the Other (however these are defined), then the non-disposability, indeed the indispensability of such action, should be paramount, including sustained reflection on diplomatic means and ends as well as changes of value and meaning across contexts. Roughly, this is what we understand by a diplomacy that is sustainable; yet in recognition of conceptual contests and contextual shifts we have opted for the plural term sustainable diplomacies.
Some might wish it possible to put such a complex task more simply; others might find 'sustainable diplomacies' to be a less than felicitous concept. Indeed, being or becoming 'sustainable', associating individual and collective behaviour with 'sustainability' may have become the politically correct sound to make these days; but it would be wrong simply to view this as fashion, and thus to dismiss or diminish the value of what is essentially a wake up call for reflexive praxis. The term sustainable diplomacy, introduced in the work of David Wellman (2004 and further elaborated in Chapter 1 of this book), suggests the need to convert ecological discourse and religious texts into diplomatic policy and initiative aiming at 'a more intimate and profound understanding of the lives, beliefs and concerns of people "on the ground"' (Wellman, 2004, p. 4) . This is the promise of diplomacy for Wellman, who argues that in fulfilling it there should be genuine space 'for NGOs, religious organizations and various peoples' movements to contribute to policy formation and act as diplomats in their own right'. Thus Wellman's is a proposition for inclusiveness, both of non-state actors commonly excluded from conventional interstate diplomacy and of ideas, like religious and ecological thought, when and where they are appropriate and meaningful to the mediation of inter-communal relations and the protection of ecosystems.
Sustainable diplomacy brings to the picture a new attitude, a new political vision, and it should be underlined here that sustainability is not just an environmental term. It is increasingly a cultural one, a way of doing things in different social contexts, preserving forms of life and being, while having the interests of both current and future generations in mind. Not being a fixed term it can and has been used to spin the effects of policy or legitimate diplomatic action or inaction. Consider, for example, how the former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, employed the term 'sustained peace' and the need to bring about 'sustained peace' as a reason for not calling for the immediate cessation of violence during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 2006.
So, just like diplomatic practice, the use of the term sustainable and its offshoots should be constantly assessed as to their implications in different contexts. But the point remains that this new attitude and political vision calls upon theorists and practitioners to approach global problems through critical thinking and in more holistic terms: that is to say, with an eye on the complexity of local and global relationships that not only trouble a rigid 'us' vs. 'them' approach, but also expose hierarchies, exclusions, marginalizations and real or symbolic violence that purports to secure the Self and manage the Other. This vision utilizes what has been aptly described as 'diplomatic thinking', which itself produces a distinctly 'diplomatic understanding' of a situation, being the product of 'people who occupy and work in the space between those they represent' (Sharp, 2009 and also Chapter 12). It calls on sustainable diplomacy to work within but also against pronounced policy restraints Our goal is to articulate a sustainable diplomacy that keeps alive the hope of mediating difference. To bring the study and practice closer to this end, we first need to revisit the unsustainable biases of the modern diplomatic system and then seek to retrieve sustainable forms and engaged practices of diplomacy. Through this we envision a sustainable diplomacy in which a wide range of actors, varying in identity, interests and power, mediate their differences through new techniques of interconnectivity, in line with developments outlined and elaborated in recent studies on the changing character of diplomatic practice (e.g. Betsill and Corell, 2008; Cooper, Hocking and Maley, 2008; Melissen, 2005; Minear and Smith, 2007; Riordan, 2003; Sharp, 1999) .
The modern diplomatic system and its biases
The modern diplomatic system first imposed in Europe and then worldwide an order that was highly exclusionary. The ius legationis (the right to send and receive embassies) came to be associated only with actors possessing sovereign statehood. Except for a few notable examples -like the Holy See after the unification of Italy in 1871 and before the Lateran Treaty in 1929 -for those not possessing territorial sovereignty the right to diplomacy was denied unless and until the governments of sovereign PROOF states recognized them as such; that is, not just as a different entity or issue-specific group, but as a significant political actor that deserved diplomatic engagement rather than the mere exercise of governance. In other words, the mediation of difference was qualitatively different if one lacked diplomatic identity. It could be just (and not necessarily always) a question of simply debating how the law or the will of the sovereign was to be implemented, not a question of negotiating the law or seeking to reconcile opposing wills. In short, in the modern international system, the bestowal of diplomatic identity became a means of empowerment -its denial a means of disempowerment.
The restrictive tendency in the use of the diplomatic designation was indicative of an attempt by the more powerful rulers and institutions in Europe to extend their legal and political competencies at the expense of the less powerful. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) did not initiate but institutionalized the new political changes that began earlier on to challenge medieval and papal authority in Europe. The medieval diplomatic order was indeed hierarchical but more flexible in terms of ascribing diplomatic pedigree, including actors other than the powerful princes (Queller, 1967) . Such was also the Roman diplomatic order, which even at its imperial apogee kept in service a range of legations (invariably dealing with negotiation, adjudication, supplication and religious ceremony) and crucially retained the ius legationis to subjugated cities, thus restricting the power of the Roman governor to regulate the affairs and well-being of foreign peoples. In other words, besides diplomatic relations with communities outside the empire, groups of people within the empire retained an institutionalized right to diplomacy, specifically to petition the emperor and renegotiate the implementation and terms of their subjection. So it is not at all surprising to find that in late medieval writings the legatus was still very broadly conceived, in the words of the jurist Guilielmus Durandus, as quicumque ab alio missus, meaning 'anyone sent by another'. 3 It is this broad understanding that received a serious blow first by pre-Westphalian state practice and then by diplomatic theory and law. Backed by state ordinances and policed by its functionaries, from the sixteenth century onwards 'all diplomatic missions between French citizens and other states required the approval (letters de créance) of the French government -an approval that was only given if the embassy was actually on behalf of the state' (Holszgrefe, 1989, p. 16 ). This was a practice that was progressively enforced by other European states as well, meaning that legates and ambassadors from and to cities, bishops, monasteries, vassals, assemblies, universities, syndicates, merchants, condottieres and groups of citizens lost their diplomatic designation and became mere 'agents', 'procurators' and 'officials'.
Diplomatic writings and international law followed suit. The 'founding fathers' of international law, Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius, though writing in Latin and drawing numerous embassy examples from the diverse Roman practice of legatio, were both in the business of erasing diversity from modern diplomatic practice. Gentili acknowledges some of these practices in De Legationibus. He does this so as to avoid conceptual difficulties and being 'embarrassed by ambiguity in the term', but goes on to specify that 'the basis of the definition we are framing' is that the legatus is someone sent 'by the state . . . in the name of the state, and as the representative of the state' (Gentili, 1594 (Gentili, /1924 . Grotius exemplifies deep historical knowledge in the 'Ius Legationis' chapter of De Jure Belli ac Pacis yet remains silent of alternative cultures of diplomacy and treats the diversity of Roman and Greek diplomatic practices as inconsequential (Grotius, 1648 (Grotius, /1925 ; further on this, see Constantinou, 1996) .
To that extent, the right of embassy as developed in the modern Law of Nations became part of the discursive armoury that denied independence and legitimated control over people and territories. Both Gentili and Grotius are unequivocal that embassies should not be sent by or to a subject. At different historical periods the right of embassy was also denied to such diplomatic 'exceptions' that were not subjects, like outlaws, infidels and barbarians. We moreover come across patriarchal edicts like those of Lord Hankey, which forbade 'the use of the word "diplomacy" in speaking of the relations within the family circle of the British Empire' (quoted in Lloyd, 2000, p. 47) . Thus the development of ius legationis as customary international law gave new legal parameters to those with interest and power to subjugate others; it normalized through the juridical absence of diplomacy relationships of subservience rather than of equality.
This has specific resonance to the colonization and subjugation of non-European peoples and the destruction or cooptation of their polities. Colonized subjects were often found lacking in Western civility and denied the diplomatic identity ab initio, as Sam Okoth Opondo shows in Chapter 5. Specifically, Opondo argues that non-state, non-Christian and non-governmental modes of encountering otherness in Africa were systematically erased by Western diplomacy, through its colonial officials and missionaries, and in favour of encounters that converted and normalized African subjectivity in order to properly deal with indigenous otherness. This strategic mediation of otherness created new forms of estrangement on the ground. But it also produced caricatures of Western diplomacy like Emperor Bokasa, who followed Napoleonic protocol, or Idi Amin Dada denigrating English diplomacy as the king of Scotland, or lately the Lord's Resistance Army in a new mission to re-Christianize Africans.
The colonial encounter did, of course, display variety and did not always deny the native's diplomatic identity. When not, however, it still found ways to progressively scale it down or domesticate it. This ranged from selectivity in sending or receiving 'ambassadors' depending on the colonizer's control of territory (such as with the Asante); to the denial or sovereign interpretation of treaties signed with natives following the formal establishment of colonial rule (such as with the Maoris, Aborigines and American Natives); to the fixing or modifying of the designation 'ambassador', 'representative', 'commissioner', 'resident', etc. as a means of registering the right of interference or exposing a lack of autonomy or rewarding loyalty (such as with the Nepalese); to the increasing or decreasing of diplomatic protocol when dealing with rulers of colonized polities (such as the number of gun-salutes fired in their honour and used for ranking the rajas and maharajas under the British Raj). 4 All in all, this was diplomacy in the service of empire-building -through its practice or its denial. It was not a means to communicate with, understand and mediate the Other across cultural borders; a more progressive form of dealing with a complex world re-branded in the decolonization period as the 'new diplomacy' (Rossow, 1962) .
Typically the launching of the campaign for aboriginal rights in Australia started with nothing less than the establishment of a Tent Embassy (originally a beach umbrella upgraded to a makeshift structure) outside the old Parliament House in Canberra in 1972. Unsurprisingly, the Australian government has not recognized the embassy's status, and its response has varied from early attempts at forceful removal and harassment to more recent 'benign' propositions of an 'aesthetic cleansing', trading off the 'removal of the embassy in return for permanent meeting rooms, memorial plaques and reconciliation paths' -all to no avail. The Tent Embassy reached an iconic status in Aboriginal political history as many activists 'attributed the raising of their political consciousness and education to the embassy' as well as learning through it about 'the nature of history itself, in terms of perspective, power and the ability for the powerful to impose their interpretation on the rest of us' (Dow, 2000) . To have the symbolic right to employ the instruments of modern diplomacy was perceived as a sign of political respect to Aboriginal voices and demands as well as a means of engaging in a non-hierarchical -if still asymmetric -dialogue. More recently, although the Australian government has not recognized it as a de jure embassy, it seems to have accepted it de facto, and it is now listed on the National Estate by the Australian Heritage Commission; perhaps a symbolic recognition of diplomacy-to-come.
The Western vision of modern diplomacy may be dominant but it is not unchallengeable, nor sealed off from revision by non-Western forces. Indeed, as Iver Neumann suggests in Chapter 6, the founding myths and narrative socializations of modern diplomacy may still be predominantly Christian and Eurocentric but they have been eased by hybridization. Other actors attempt to 'insert [their] own founding myths into the diplomatic culture', and in the specific context where this may appear necessary and functional, it is no longer an issue of contestation. In short, the Western diplomatic system and society of states have developed and are no longer as exclusionary as they used to be, at least with regard to sovereign state actors. Take, for example, Colonel Qaddafi: he can insert his own Bedouin imaginary into the official practice of modern diplomacy (a global theatre show of tents, camels and female bodyguards) and this has come to be accepted. For postcolonial diplomacy to be a credible proposition, it must appear to be inclusive of non-Western diplomatic norms as well. Though protocol is perhaps a soft issue, it still displays a willingness to be inclusive in high profile symbolic areas and a sign of the potential for change in diplomatic culture.
Furthermore, state sovereignty never held complete control over the modern diplomatic system. Sovereignty has been 'perforated' in various and complex ways, meaning that all kinds of non-state and sub-state actors have found ways to practise diplomacy despite their formal ban -be it mission sending, regional cooperation, treaty signing or legally opting out from specific national and international commitments. In the diplomatic studies literature, this has come to be known as 'paradiplomacy' (see Aldecoa and Keating, 1999 and Der Derian, 1987, pp. 5, 203) , though there is also recognition that this term is conceptually unsatisfactory to the extent that it approaches 'diplomacy' as an essentially interstate affair. As Noé Cornago shows in Chapter 4, 'paradiplomacy' is a wide-ranging practice, an old as well as new reality and functional need. Paradoxically, conventional interstate diplomacy is sustained by the very thing it defines itself against, or distinguishes itself from, namely sub-state or non-state diplomacy, and this because it needs to find a way of dealing with the plurality of voic es around the world and to mediate more effectively the multiple forms of estrangement, which are never just interstate. In short, the historical and contemporary PROOF durability of paradiplomacy tells us something about both the practical limits of interstate diplomacy and the increasing recognition of those limits by the governments of states that either enhance or allow or are just unable to stop the use of paradiplomacy. Furthermore, local and international NGOs have recently entered into the picture to broaden our understanding of diplomatic stakeholders. As Arne Strand suggests in Chapter 8, with regard to 'sustained peacebuilding', what is required is 'a strategic and equal partnership between international and local NGOs and researchers' that seeks not merely to support peace settlements but to 'engender peace and embed a culture of peace on a daily basis'. Para-, sub-, intra-, supra-and trans-national diplomacy is as much the order of the day these days as is inter-national diplomacy.
Still, the normative and dominant claims about the monopolization of the ius legationis by the state means that students of diplomacy have inherited and largely taken for granted the conceptual fixations and biases of modern international law and practice. In doing so they often miss how institutionalized diplomacy is never just about regulating state relations or even only about regulating relations with foreigners, but that it also crucially involves the identification, representation and interpretation of foreignness. The latter is important because it enables and legitimates the application of specific ways and means of dealing with the abstracted Other rather than different ways and means. The diplomatic pedigree has value in determining how the Other is conceptualized and mediated, what freedoms, immunities and opportunities are available to the Other, what powers the Other has in regional and global forums, what is the status of agreements signed by the Other and so on and so forth.
From raison d'état to modus vivendi
This is not to suggest that the modern diplomatic system and Western diplomatic theory brought only biases and no insights for sustainable diplomacy. The problem is rather that such insights were either purposely ignored or selectively interpreted in ways that supported the dominant forms of statecraft and realpolitik rather than more sustainable forms of diplomacy.
Take, for example, the insights of one of the canonical figures of diplomatic theory and practice, Cardinal Richelieu, and how these insights are selectively recounted by a contemporary theorist and practitionerfor some the master diplomatist -namely Henry Kissinger (1994, pp. 56-77) . Richelieu for Kissinger is important because he is seen as the pioneer and promoter of the principle of raison d'état. Kissinger misses the impact of Richelieu's Italian predecessors, Machiavelli and Guiciardini, and their contributions in developing the notion of ragione di stato (Viroli, 1992) , but this is perhaps less important for our purposes. What is most critical is that Kissinger's long meditation on Richelieu makes no mention whatsoever of what Richelieu himself considered as his main innovation, which was, as Richelieu says, 'up to then completely neglected': namely the principle of 'continuous negotiation' (Richelieu, 1688 (Richelieu, /1961 . Continuous negotiation seeks sustained engagement with the Other even while at war, Richelieu insists, rejecting thus political denigration and demonization even under the most severe of circumstances.
By ignoring this aspect of Richelieu's work, Kissinger promotes an absolutist and apologist form of modern diplomacy. Narrating the story of diplomacy as a celebration of 'great men' (many of whom bear an uncanny resemblance to Kissinger), Kissinger further conflates diplomacy with foreign policy. Even though a rigid distinction between the two can indeed be unhelpful, failure to make basic distinctions between the formulation and implementation of policy can be especially problematic when seeking to practise sustainable diplomacy. Suffice to recall that raison d'état was at the time a novel principle of French foreign policy whereas continuous negotiation was a novel principle of diplomacy meant to counterbalance isolated policy making and excess.
The importance of continuous and persistent negotiation is underscored in the chapters by Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, taking issue with criticisms that over-eagerness to engage in dialogue and overextension in negotiation entail high risks for the foreign policy of great powers. Sharp shows in Chapter 12 that 'the determination to talk and the disposition to appease' are diplomatic values that need to be rescued and reflected upon. With regard to the first, it opens the door to possibilities that 'cannot exist or develop without [official or unofficial] talks', which should not be necessarily policy-driven or content-saturated. With regard to the second, the disposition to appease, Sharp seeks to rehabilitate the concept of appeasement by suggesting, controversially but persuasively, that diplomats ought to be able to consider and deliberate the unthinkable, to scrutinize all possible options brought to the negotiating table including those that one side or the other publicly declare as an anathema. This should not be read as a foreign policy concession but as a technical exercise whereby diplomats demon strate to their masters 'the existence of multiple possible outcomes and the way in which it is conceivable that life, and lives, could continue under them'. This is especially useful, if not essential, in order to 'break the banks of the PROOF relatively few channels down which foreign policies seem to have to flow in crises, to reduce the pressure on political leaders to follow this flow, and to dilute the reservoirs of public support for the various claims made to the effect that there are no alternatives to whatever course of action is being presented as necessary and unavoidable'. As Wiseman further explains in Chapter 10, continuous dialogue is a basic norm of diplomatic culture (on the normative and instrumental use of diplomatic culture see Bull, 1997; Der Derian, 1996; Wiseman, 2005) . Wiseman rightly suggests that the norm of continuous dialogue 'carries with it the idea of not isolating adversarial states, the underlying assumption being that new, revolutionary, enemy and/or recalcitrant states will over time accept prevailing norms and standards of appropriate behaviourbecome "socialized" -through sustained diplomatic encounters with the society of sovereign states' (see also Amstrong, 1993) .
From this perspective, diplomacy cannot and should not escape its socializing disposition. In fact, in the history of diplomatic thought there are discussions on whether states or other diplomatic actors do indeed have not only a right but a duty to diplomacy, i.e. an obligation to receive embassies, including their representations, and not to unreasonably deny them (Grotius, 1646 (Grotius, /1926 . The problem, however, has been that during the expansion of Western power and rule this duty of diplomacy has been extended to the right of Western states to impose 'communication' or particular forms of diplomacy upon others and to progressively and legally justify the use of force if that right was denied (see, for example, Moser and Moser, 1993 , pp. 7-11, with reference to the Chinese empire, and Vitoria, 1532 /1995 , with reference to Native Americans). It is crucial, therefore, not to turn this highly important socializing mission of diplomacy into a civilizing one.
Continuous negotiation offers a counterbalance to the potential abuses of raison d'état that could pursue a policy of demonizing the enemy and rendering him incommunicado. And here, contra Richelieu, we must note that raison d'état is liable to serious moral questioning. It inspires an exclusive vision of diplomacy as statecraft, that is as a self-effacing and other-effacing practice, often likened to a chessboard or poker game, whereby the calculation of state power and interest is predominant and the moves conducted by Great Leaders and Great Diplomats range from pragmatic to visionary (for this kind of diplomacy and a plethora of examples, see Kissinger, 1994 ; for a critique, see Der Derian, 1995) . One does not have to agree with the counter-reformation moralizing that inspired the early criticisms of raison d'état, like Giovanni Botero's Della Ragione di Stato (On the Reason of State), to concur with the suggestion that social justice is an important dimension that the reason-of-state understanding systematically defers.
Although reason of state still predominates in the writings of celebrated diplomatic theorists as well as in the hagiographies of national diplomatic practice (written by politicians, advisors and careerists), it is also increasingly and persuasively criticized by practitioners who see its negative effects on the ground (e.g. Kiesling, 2006; Ross, 2007) . Highly complex problems are further complicated, as Roland Bleiker shows in Chapter 11, by 'a state-based understanding of diplomacy and an insideoutside conception of security'. What is urgently required to reverse this is recognition of the 'interconnectedness of security issues' combined with more emphasis 'on the transformative potential entailed in day-to-day diplomatic activities' (see further Bleiker, 2005) .
Critiques have also been produced from within the diplomatic theory literature, and notably in the so-called English School (Neumann, 2003; Sharp, 2003) , and especially in the works of Herbert Butterfield (1954) and Adam Watson (1982) . The potential negative effects of raison d'état on diplomatic practice have been often counterbalanced by reference to the diplomat's ability to act also on the basis of a raison de système. This views the professionalization of diplomacy as bringing about not only a national and privileged elite in crude pursuit of national interest but a cosmopolitan agency with a distinctive esprit de corps that allows diplomats to act often in solidarity with their non-national colleagues and with the conscious intention of reconciling complex interests and preserving the peaceful order. From this angle, diplomacy's value as an interstate process is less in the servile following of instructions or unconditional securing of foreign policy objectives but rather in the securing and effective functioning of the diplomatic system, which has to include the recognition and accommodation of the vital interests and needs of others. This is certainly more successful in certain cases than others, as Mai'a Cross shows in Chapter 9 on the conditions of sustainable diplomacy within the EU. A factor that contributes to this is 'prolonged dialogue in which EU diplomats operate on the basis of achieving consensus, instead of hard-bargaining to "win" material benefits for their capitals'. This in turn leads EU diplomats to 'not only persuade each other but to also convince their capitals to redefine their interests and pursue outcomes that are beneficial to all member states'. The level of sustainable diplomacy is therefore very high within the EU system, something that has changed the EU network of diplomats from bureaucratic committees to influential epistemic communities (Cross, 2007) .
PROOF
However, the promise of diplomacy will remain limited if sustainable diplomacy is seen as a modernist liberal institution that can be practised only in certain quarters, e.g. only within the EU. It breeds arrogance that this is where the ultimate diplomatic culture exists and needs to be emulated, exported and, in the end, perhaps imposed. John Gray's critique of liberal institutions is pertinent here; specifically their selfperception 'that they are nearly universally mandated as conditions of human well-being in the late modern period [something that] neglects the variety of institutions within which a modus vivendi can be achieved in our time, and unduly privileges variations of western models' (Gray, 1995, p. viii) . In a similar manner, the variety of institutions within which sustainable diplomacy can be practised should not be neglected. Seeing human beings and their communities as practitioners of cultures rather than 'individual specimens of generic humanity' may be a better and more 'diplomatic' means to understand their diverse positions and values on specific issues. This can create recognition that achieving one's 'rightful' ends is not always tenable nor should it be the primary end of diplomacy. A more pragmatic and less violent approach is to build relationships, devise terms of co-existence, and establish a modus vivendi, literally a mode of living.
Of course, the modus vivendi restrictively perceived is itself an instrument of statecraft through which states agree to differ and so temporarily find agreement in disagreement. This can have diverse implications: it can certainly freeze disaccord and bring about a period of peace and security (which can be welcome). But note that it can also prolong and support an unfair status quo, for example, if the modus vivendi concerns human rights violations or environmental abuse (meaning, in effect, that the modus vivendi has the potential of institutionalizing oppression). If seen through the prism of sustainability, however, the modus vivendi follows on continuous negotiation to develop conditions for social and political accommodation among people holding not just opposite views but irreconcilable values. Sustained diplomatic conduct is indeed most useful where agreement is tentative or seems impossible at a comprehensive level (Jackson, 2000; Sharp, 2009) .
In this respect, Hussein Banai is right to suggest in Chapter 2 that it is important for diplomacy to address the public imagination: that is, 'the representations of the past bearing upon present cultural and political attitudes'. He argues that
[m]erely to mediate between estranged publics who continue to insist on the absolute or universal validity of their own grand narratives, identities, traditions, and uniqueness will not deliver them from estrangement. Instead, what diplomacy can and must do is to attempt to transform those aspects of public imagination that engender difference and lead to exclusion. It can achieve this by deterritorializing and decentring the discourses and disciplines that delimit and confine opposing views and imaginations. This is not in order to reach a liberal consensus based on universal reason, but rather so as to 'enact pluralism, to continually articulatenot just mediate -reasons for the importance of maintaining a logic of cohabitation and critical dialogue'. What this underscores is the transformative potential of diplomacy, also taken up by Costas Constantinou in Chapter 3 of the book. By coining the term homodiplomacy, Con stantinou explores a form of diplomacy that engages in heterology to revisit and rearticulate homology, 'whose mission is not only the knowledge and control of the Other but fundamentally the knowl edge of the Self -and crucially this knowledge of the Self as a more reflective means of dealing with and transforming relations with Others'. This can be the result of an 'unofficial' experimental diplomacy of the everyday, but it is also something that has been occasionally institutionalized in Western and non-Western societies whereby spirituality has been positively employed to develop an ethic of encounter and durable relationship with Others.
Taken as a whole, this collection seeks to synchronize the study and practice of diplomacy with transformations taking place in international politics. Power is being reconfigured at an infrastructural level not yet fully comprehended. Networks are challenging and changing the nature of state power through new lattices of relatedness and responsiveness. To be sure, the US remains the dominant military and economic power; but post-9/11, post-Iraq, post-Great Recession, competing sources and mediations of power have emerged, constituting what we call the new global heteropolarity, in which a wide range of new actors are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity. Varying in identity, interests and strength, ranging from fundamentalist terrorists to peace activists, new global actors now gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology rather than through the narrow stovepipe of territorially based sovereign governments. Enhanced by multiple platforms of networked media, non-state actors have become super-empowered 'diplomats' as well as militants. In this information-enriched environment, traditional forms of statecraft are transformed, and in some cases undermined, not just by infowar but PROOF also by infopeace, through which information is produced by peaceful means for peaceful ends.
New proto-, anti-and para-diplomatic phenomena exceed even the catch-all phrase of 'public diplomacy'. Indeed, as Anthony Deos and Geoffrey Pigman argue in Chapter 7, we need to widen our understanding of public diplomacy; a 'sustainable public diplomacy' requires genuine and 'ongoing bi-directional communication of listening as well as speaking between a government and a foreign public'. This is in order not only to reconcile specific interests or discover common ones but also to allow a sustained communicative process to inform subjectivities and reconstruct identities on the ground.
By providing new global actors the means to traverse political, economic, religious and cultural boundaries, various networks -from cable news and political blogs to YouTube and Twitter -are changing not only how war is fought and peace is made, but are making it ever more critical to find new ways to mediate an extended spectrum of conflict and cooperation. By taking into account the heteropolar as well as multicultural nature of global politics, we hope this collection will help produce and extend global networks of knowledge and authority for a sustainable diplomacy. Viroli, Mauricio (1992) 193, 196, 197, 199-200, 202-3; culture of compromise 199-200; dangers facing 193; diplomatic culture 194-6, 204, 205, 209; diplomatic networks 194; diplomats 208; enlargement 208-9; Neumann, Iver B 12, 93, 103, 11, 102 Nicolaidis, Harold 5, 125, 194 Nigeria 96, 120-2 PROOF subsidiarity 37, 202 Sudan 177, 242 sufficiency 38 Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad (Bolton) 224 sustainability 2-3, 7-8, 30-1, 33, 37, 38, 45, 153 
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